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Environmentalists and opponents of oil refineries drew on popular images of the 
Maine coast as a tranquil and pastoral place untouched by the modern era. Images 
such as this early-twentieth-century photograph of Broad Cove, Eastport, stood in 
sharp contrast with plans for supertanker ports.
Maine Historical Photograph Collection, Fogler Library Special Collections. 
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library; University of Maine.
SCRIPTING MAINE’S 
ENVIRONMENTALIST MAJORITY: 
THE “THEATER OF OIL,” 1968-1975
Christopher Beach argues that Maine's contemporary environmental 
movement was created in the late 1960s when oil companies seeking 
sites for new refineries and tanker ports saw the Maine coast as ide­
ally situated for expansion: close to southern New England and the 
mid-Atlantic coast, but relatively undeveloped and in need o f eco­
nomic re-energizing or so they thought. Hearings and conflict among 
fishers, state and local officials and politicians, residents (seasonal 
and permanent) and environmentalists created a long-term debate 
that in turn spawned a new understanding o f Maine as a pastoral 
landscape for the modern world. Christopher Beach received his J.D. 
from the University o f Mainet School o f Law and his Ph.D. in Cana- 
dian-American History from the University o f Maine. He is an assis­
tant professor o f History/Humanities at Unity College in Unity, 
Maine.
he playwrights and cast of the “Theater of Oil” were an unlikely
coalition of summer people, natives, newcomers, retirees, activists
new and old, journalists, lawyers, a governor, promoters, and citi­
zens. Together they engaged in an extended public political performance 
that helped Mainers of all kinds redefine the state and reconstruct their 
understandings of region and home place. Their performance projected 
a new set of images of Maine to the national scene and, in the process, 
helped to create Maine’s “environmentalist majority.” Postindustrial 
Maine was created during an intense and dramatic period: the “Theater 
of Oil” opened in 1968 and closed around 1975.
According to a 1971 Forbes magazine article, it was now “nearly im­
possible to build an electric power plant, a jet airport, an open-pit mine, 
or a resort complex without strong protest from keep-out forces.” Taken 
aback by this onslaught against the politics of growth, an Oregon Pacific 
Power and Light official articulated the rationale for industrial expan­
sion in guarded tones: “I know that . . .  development. . .  conjures up the 
idea of smokestacks, lunch buckets, etc. and this is in conflict with the 
uncluttered, tranquil landscape that all of us would like to have. But I
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think you will all concede . . . that [in the future] we will have lots of 
people here. We must plan for them, and they have to have jobs.” The 
Forbes editor mused nostalgically: “Remember when the high school 
band— not pickets— met those visiting industrial delegations?” In addi­
tion to posing a serious challenge to growth, local campaigns brought 
together a diverse collection of civic, scientific, and conservation groups, 
forging a new environmentalist ethic that spread quickly to other areas 
and concerns as the decade passed.1
For Maine, the point of departure for popularizing the environmen­
tal movement was the coast. In 1968, Maine became embroiled in a se­
ries of oil refinery and tanker port proposals that threatened to despoil a 
landscape of fishing villages and seascapes synonymous with the state’s 
individualism and traditional way of life. Bluntly put, the issue was not 
the possibility of “spill[ing] a little oil,” but rather preserving a pastoral 
icon. “A water view . . .  is a refreshment to the heart. . .  We do not want 
to stare at oil tanks, nor have them stare back.” Opposition first arose 
among urban preservationists and summer home owners, but this nar­
row political base expanded quickly, as virtually every group with an in­
terest in the future of the coast joined in the debate.2
Defending Maine’s rock-bound coast popularized environmental 
goals and bridged class and regional differences. Here again, environ­
mentalists invoked a successful litany: drawing attention to these power­
ful symbols of regional identity, they rallied popular sentiment to defend 
the public trust against “outside” urban and industrial enemies. Pastoral 
images, cast in ecological terms and disseminated by energetic grass­
roots groups, conservation organizations, and environmental journal­
ists, kindled a new, broad-based environmental imagination, affirming 
the emergence of Maine as a postindustrial “nature state.” Maine’s envi­
ronmentalist majority, a central feature of its late-twentieth-century po­
litical culture, emerged from this “Theater of Oil.”3
A key example of landscape preservation, the coastal campaign in 
Maine demonstrates the blossoming of the environmental imagination. 
Threats from an easily identifiable “outside” enemy invoked a fierce de­
fense of place, making the preservation battle incendiary, especially with 
the politics of growth also under siege. The controversy brought envi­
ronmental organizing and environmental rhetoric to its height and 
forced officials to respond to popular activism with planning proposals 
that attempted to channel this new environmentalist energy in less con­
frontational directions.
In 1968, all but two percent of Maine’s coastline was in private
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hands, and the most conspicuous owners were wealthy seasonal resi­
dents. Thus critics of preservation could legitimately ask who gained 
from locking up the coast like a “giant state park” Up to this point, 
Maine politics had adhered more closely to traditional growth strategies. 
The textile crisis had passed, but Maine's economic growth indicators 
still ranked near the bottom nationwide. Jobs, cost of living, economic 
growth, and taxes remained high priorities, and for these reasons, more 
than half the people in the state would favor oil refineries on the coast. 
Locally, however, Mainers rejected the specific proposals that violated 
their sense of place: no particular location was found to be ideal for de­
velopment. Moreover, as opponents pointed out, refineries offered only 
limited job opportunities for local people; more often they attracted 
skilled workers from outside the state, people who compromised 
Maine's powerful attachment to local sovereignty. Still, resolving Maine’s 
oil controversies was contingent on finding alternative jobs for coastal 
residents.4
From the beginning, Maine's coastal controversy was shaped by out- 
of-state interests. Promoters of independent oil firms were the first to 
identify Maine's undeveloped deep water coastline as a site for new re­
fineries. The idea was embraced enthusiastically by the New England 
Council for Economic Development, a Boston-based regional chamber 
of commerce. Opposition to the refinery proposals also came first from 
outsiders. Maine’s summer residents raised the alarm, seconded by the 
New England chapter of the Sierra Club, also based in Boston. This pat­
tern—powerful out-of-state industrialists battling sophisticated out-of- 
state preservationists—was typical of Maine's early environmental poli­
tics. As the controversy unfolded, though, local interests entered the fray. 
By the time the oil dispute subsided, the heady process of public debate, 
media reports, legislative compromise, and executive management had 
prepared Mainers to formulate and conduct future environmental con­
troversies on their own.5
The struggle to protect the coast changed Maine's popular environ­
mental politics in three ways. First, it galvanized an environmental es­
tablishment. It provided opportunities to build advocacy organizations 
and media readerships, and it opened up careers for environmental 
journalists, planners, consultants, and politicians. During several years 
of intense popular debate, these oil controversy professionals had time 
to refine their positions, sharpen their public images, and define issues 
in various public forums. Journalists refined the art of environmental 
analysis; public leaders tuned their rhetoric to a new environmental con­
stituency; consulting economists built careers around their planning ex­
pertise.
Second, the oil controversy had a substantial impact on public con­
sciousness. Concern for the coast was channeled through a new legisla­
tive process: agency-sponsored public hearings on specific development 
issues. This grassroots stage for popular “witnessing” catapulted local 
citizens into the decision-making and opinion-forming process. It cre­
ated a new popular consciousness, so intensely focused that the gover­
nor’s office eventually found it necessary to change both the format for 
public input and the planning process itself.
Third, the controversy changed the ideological configurations of 
Maine politics. Democratic leaders like Senator Edmund S. Muskie ar­
gued the importance of jobs and judged this against the whims of what 
he labeled “summer residents, visitors and suburban residents” looking 
after their lifestyles. In turn, preservationists cast these public officials as 
old-style conservationists out of touch with Maine’s new concerns. 
Rhetorically, the split between “new conservationists” and “old conser­
vationists” had become clear by 1970. In fact, no oil or petrochemical 
complex was ever built on the Maine coast, and the controversy was 
brought to a close not so much by popular outcry as by national and in­
ternational energy developments. But the impact of the controversy was 
crucial to the formation of a new popular environmental conscious­
ness—Maine’s environmentalist majority.6
The dilemma of coastal development fell heaviest on Governor Ken­
neth M. Curtis, who held office between 1967 and 1973. To environmen­
talists, Curtis was an enigma: “No governor since the late Percival P. Bax­
ter has spoken out more forcefully. . . on conservation matters,” they 
acknowledged, yet like all postwar Maine leaders, Curtis was a strong ad­
vocate of growth. Maine’s poor were still unable to find decent jobs, he 
reminded his constituents, and the exodus of rural youth undermined 
the state’s future. To stem this outflow, Curtis proposed intensive use of 
natural resources and more incentives to draw industries and tourists to 
Maine. Thus, despite his rhetorical support for environmentalism, Cur­
tis remained aloof from the coastal preservation issue. “Summer people 
failed to apply themselves to the solution of Maine’s hinterland trou­
bles,” he said. Having made their money off of industrial growth else­
where, they held back industrial development in Maine. “Their fall, win­
ter and spring habitats have become unbearably foul and now they’re 
worried about the summer nest.”7
Yet in an increasingly polarized political climate, coastal preservation
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Governor Kenneth M. Curtis was an advocate for economic growth and develop­
ment in the state, but he came to cooperate with the emerging‘environmentalist 
majority.” Photograph from The Curtis Years, 1967-1974, edited by Allen G. Pease 
(Augusta, ME: Office of the Governor, 1974). Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Li­
brary, University of Maine.
could not be dismissed easily. Environmentalists, having cast the paper 
industry as the archvillain in earlier fights to save the state’s rivers, now 
took aim at other corporations and grew even more insistent. But labor, 
the core of Maine’s Democratic constituency, remained lukewarm about 
this environmental agenda. Curtis tried to straddle a growing gulf in 
Maine’s liberal constituency by insisting on statewide planning, begin­
ning with a survey to identify Maine’s unique natural sites. Planning 
would ensure these sites would not be “trampled to death in the state’s 
rush for development profits.” To insulate development needs from the 
antigrowth mood threatening Maine’s fragile economy, Curtis high­
lighted the State Planning Office as a key administrative agency. With 
the icons of the nature state encased in protective law, he believed, 
Maine could move ahead to “broaden its economic base without de­
tracting from its environmental integrity.” The oil controversy was an 
extraordinary political debate because it operated at a cultural level, not 
just a political level and it marked a major transition in Maine history, 
helping Maine people emerge from a pessimistic sense of their own 
marginality and helplessness. The controversy’s drama unfolded in four
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acts. Act 1 raised a new question—could Maine be something other than 
expendable or quaint? Act 2 answered that question with a resounding 
“yes.” The climactic act 3 confirmed that Mainers of all kinds agreed on 
the new cultural definition of their state and act 4 helped institutionalize 
the new environmental understanding. Maine's “Theater of Oil” firmly 
established the state as a national leader in the emergent national politi­
cal culture centered on the values of environmentalism.8
Act 1. Downeast Maine: Expendable or Quaint
The controversy began in June 1968, when Governor Curtis an­
nounced a proposal to build a tanker port and refinery in the small town 
of Machiasport, near the Canadian border. Later that year, additional 
port and refinery proposals emerged for the state's heavily populated 
Casco Bay, and in 1970 for Penobscot Bay, the state's most picturesque 
coastal area. These projects were motivated by new oil tanker technol­
ogy. East Coast ports could handle ships up to 60,000 deadweight tons, 
but this was only one-fifth the size of the new supertankers. Maine's 
deep water harbors offered an obvious alternative.9
Advocates for the oil proposals first cast their arguments in terms of 
regional economic benefits. Among the earliest supporters of the Machi- 
asport project was the New England Council, representing major busi­
ness, labor, professional, public, financial, utility, and industrial interests. 
The Council was organized in 1925 by the six New England governors to 
deal with the textile crisis, and promoting oil was a logical extension of 
this earlier regional concern. Here again a natural advantage—cheap ac­
cess to deep water harbors, like cheap access to water power for textile 
mills—could outweigh the lack of a critical resource—oil or cotton— 
and create a new industry. Speaking for the Council in Portland in Octo­
ber 1968, A. Thomas Easley argued that Maine, by accepting an oil refin­
ery on its coast, would begin to contribute its fair share to New 
England's overall economic development. An oil-poor, energy-intensive 
region, New England needed the port for smaller independent dealers, 
Easley argued, to break the monopoly of the major oil companies. Lay­
ing aside a bleak picture of regional victimization, Easley painted a vi­
brant future based on competitive energy prices and regional economic 
growth, all resulting from the Machiasport proposal. Easley also dis­
missed the environmental hazards of a supertanker oil port in regional 
terms by noting that Machiasport's remoteness recommended the pro­
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posaL The town, he argued, could “handle the super-tankers . . with a 
minimum hazard to densely populated areas along the New England 
seacoast.” Easley was clearly willing to sacrifice Maine's underpopulated 
and politically weak eastern coast in order to benefit the rest of New 
England. He closed by returning to the regional theme: “This project is 
the only real hope for a deep water port and refinery on the East Coast 
that will solve the high energy costs of our forgotten region.”10
Opposition to the Machiasport refinery was also cast in regional 
terms. A pamphlet prepared and distributed widely by the New England 
chapter of the Sierra Club articulated the pastoral themes that identified 
the Maine coast as a regional icon. “Only north of Acadia National Park 
do substantial stretches of the Maine coast remain free of tourist devel­
opment and light industry.” There the landscape of small farms and fish­
ing villages remained “as it must have been a hundred years ago.” A 
Sierra Club member from Michigan who rented “Snuggle Home Cot­
tage” near the proposed refinery site extolled the picturesque cottages, 
the rough but scenic twisting roads, the wild, lonely beaches. After a 
month exploring historical sites, walking the beach, and watching lob­
ster buoys bobbing in the waves, she concluded that Machiasport was 
“one of the finest unspoiled areas on the shrinking Maine coast.” This 
summer reverie provided dramatic backdrop for enumerating the “all 
too familiar . . .  problems of overcrowding, air and water pollution” the 
refinery would bring. Passage to the docking site was hazardous because 
the bay was home to twenty-foot tides, storms, fog, and rocky shoals. A 
large spill would threaten the Georges Bank, New England's finest off­
shore fishing grounds, and Maine's tourist industry, worth $400 million 
a year, was also at stake.11
Recognizing a need to provide alternatives to the economic stimulus 
refinery promoters pledged, the Sierra Club suggested that low-impact 
tourism, based on eastern Maine's isolation, its history, and its beauty, 
would take up the slack. For readers bothered by the irony of promoting 
isolation as a means to increase the number of tourists, the Sierra Club 
offered another proposal: federal subsidies to offset lost income, if the 
area accepted national zoning and preservation controls. Local towns 
would be compensated “for surrendering their right to develop.” Those 
individuals who chose not to stay and “work hard for relatively meager 
incomes” could simply “move away.”12
With the oil issue framed in regional terms, Maine's public officials 
entered the debate. Like the New England Council, Governor Curtis ap­
proved the Machiasport site for political reasons: he thought that local
28 Maine History
resistance w ould be m inim al on  the rem ote and  econom ically  depressed 
eastern coast. Nevertheless, it w ould have been nearly im possible to lo ­
cate an oil p o rt anyw here on the M aine coast tha t was n o t w ithin the 
view o f at least a few influential sum m er residents, and  C urtis’s choice of 
S tarboard  Island in ou ter M achias Bay did  just th a t .M
The sum m er resident happened  to be G ardner M eans, a consulting 
econom ist from  W ashington D.C. M eans was undoub ted ly  shocked at 
the an n o u n cem en t tha t his su m m er view m ight now  include super­
tankers, pipelines, oil refinery stacks, and tank farm s, b u t he was too as­
tu te  to launch a d irect attack on the proposal. As a nonvoting  ou tsider—  
a “sum m er co m pla in t” in local parlance— his protest w ould lack the ring 
o f authenticity . M eans in itiated  M aine’s first local response to the oil 
proposal by posing a series o f seem ingly reasonable and balanced ques­
tions tha t did  n o t p u rp o r t to com m it the questioner to a firm position 
for o r against the proposal.
M eans posed his questions as an appo in ted  m em ber o f  G overnor 
C urtis’s ow n C ouncil o f Econom ic Advisors. In Septem ber 1968, the 
council sent the governor a list o f te n  questions, drafted  principally  by 
M eans. H ow  m uch, the C ouncil asked, would be added to developm ent 
costs if the p roposed  refinery was relocated inland, so as to m inim ize 
“the deleterious effects upon  a particu la rly  beautifu l p o rtio n  o f the 
coastline?” Were the o p p o rtu n ities  for ancillary industries— p etrochem ­
icals, sh ipbuild ing , a con ta iner p o rt— realistic? H ad the effects o f possi­
ble air and  w ater po llu tion  on clam s, lobsters, fish, blueberries, tourism , 
and  recreation been investigated adequately? The questions were n o t to 
be taken as a negative view, bu t ra ther as an o p p o rtu n ity  for “thorough  
considera tion” o f a w ider range o f issues. The council avoided challeng­
ing G overnor C urtis ou trigh t, b u t its inventory  o f  th rea tened  land and 
w ater resources im plied tha t he had  acted precipitously. Overall, the 
council advocated “m ore study”— a delay which gave the opposition  
tim e to o rgan ize.14
A nticipating  m ore overt controversy, C urtis appo in ted  an ad hoc 
C onservation  and  P lann ing  C om m ittee  on the M ach iasport Project, 
d o m ina ted  by his ow n subordinates and local officials who favored the 
refinery. The com m ittee reiterated the regional them e, suggesting that 
the  only real opposition  cam e from  the m ajo r oil firms. Local p a rtic i­
pan ts assured the governor’s representatives that their neighbors favored 
the project, as long as no pollu tion would result. H aving fulfilled its in ­
te n t— to give an appearance o f careful de liberation  and  study— the 
com m ittee  d isappeared from  the public d e b a te d -''
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Act 2. “A Somewhat Overripe Mackerel”
With the Machiasport proposal stalled in the federal permitting 
process, a second supertanker port proposal, sponsored by King Re­
sources Company, targeted the densely populated Casco Bay region near 
Portland. Portland Harbor was already the second largest importer of 
crude oil on the East Coast, servicing, among other things, a major 
pipeline from Montreal. The additional facilities, to be located at an un­
used Navy oil terminal on Long Island, would make Portland the world’s 
largest oil importing port by volume. Mindful of these benefits, the 
Portland City Council quickly rezoned the Long Island site to accommo­
date King Resources. This action energized local opponents, who gath­
ered over two thousand signatures and organized Maine’s first grass­
roots anti-oil organization under the name Citizens Who Care 
(CWC).16
Coming on the heels of the Machiasport controversy and a disas­
trous oil spill in California’s Santa Barbara channel, the Portland oil ter­
minal proposal generated an outpouring of public commentary. Aware
Large oil tankers, like this one belonging to the Pittston Company, were anathema 
to those concerned with preserving both the ecological health and the pastoral 
beauty of the Maine coast. From The Pittston Company, “Prospectus for a 250,000 
BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine,” April 19, 1973. 
Courtesy Special Collections Foyler Library, University o f Maine.
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of the potential for controversy in the vote-rich Portland area, Curtis 
confined his public statements to Machiasport, maintaining a neutral 
stance on the Portland project. Despite his attempt to smooth the trou­
bled waters, by 1969 coastal preservation had come to dominate political 
discussions in Maine. In 1969 NRCM and Maine Audubon Society 
(MAS), two groups emerging as Maine’s most active environmental or­
ganizations, formed the Coastal Resources Action Committee (CRAC), a 
full-time lobbying organization led by Republican lawyer-lobbyist Ho­
race Hildreth and his Democratic counterpart, Harold Pachios.17
CRAC’s founding underscored the professionalization of the envi­
ronmental movement. Operating in a world of powerful industrial and 
labor interests, Hildreth and Pachios were both familiar with the process 
of drafting legislation, negotiating compromises, and working within 
the system of legislative politics. In the ensuing controversy, Maine’s en­
vironmental organizations gained a remarkably professional veneer, yet 
unlike the outside organizations that initiated the controversy, they re­
mained tuned to local perspectives of people living and working on the 
coast. Playing on these concerns, the NRCM quoted Robert Monks, a 
Maine-based oil promoter with the demeanor of a Boston Brahmin who 
had dismissed the threat to coastal fisheries offhandedly If local fisher­
men could “run lobster boats, they can run [oil-spill] clean-up boats” as 
well, he said. Highlighting Monks’s disdain for the local fishing commu­
nity, the NRCM offered the folk wisdom of lobsterman Jasper Cates, 
who talked in more meaningful terms about the impact of the refinery 
on “our livelihoods, our environment, and our way of life.”18
Sensitive to a changing popular mood on the coast, the NRCM in­
troduced a theme rarely articulated in Maine: local aversion to popula­
tion growth. The predicted spin-off industries—petrochemicals, pulp 
and paper, aluminum, metal products, perhaps shipbuilding—would 
create more jobs than Maine’s “current population” could fill, the 
NRCM warned, meaning a “rapid migration into the area . . . over­
whelming both the natural environment and the way of life of the pres­
ent inhabitants”19
The message gained currency along the coast. Oil promoters had ar­
gued time and again that tanker ports and refineries would allow Maine 
a “share in the nation’s riches.” Heavy industry meant a broader tax base 
for sewage treatment plants, schools, low-cost housing, streets; it meant 
better connections, more businesses, and above all, more jobs. And yet 
along Maine’s eastern coast, insularity and sense of place bred fear of 
such changes, especially when initiated by outside promoters. One 
Downeaster worried that economic progress would bring “whorehouses
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and gambling casinos . . .  as they have in New York, New Jersey and other 
places where oil refineries are located ” The intangibles of the develop­
ment question—noise, traffic, waste problems, air and water pollution, 
crime, big government, corporate domination, loss of traditions and 
community control—worried local residents. Unlike Boston-based pro­
moters and preservationists, NRCM and CRAC learned to articulate 
their point of view in consonance with the subtle fears and concerns 
drifting through coastal communities.20
Aware that they could not “sit back and relish the prospect of a re­
gion preserved like some curiosity in amber,” the NRCM offered to co­
operate with state development planners to develop more sophisticated 
economic alternatives. “The imagination and energy [they] . , sum­
moned in the cause of preservation” would be “put at the service of the 
state in solving Washington County's very real economic problems ” The 
NRCM suggested promoting small businesses on the model of rural 
Scotland's electronics industry and Canadas aquaculture experiments. 
Environmentalists would transform Maine's fixation on growth by ap­
pending the key word “clean” to industrial development.21
With Maine people closely tuned to the controversy over two pend­
ing oil proposals, the issue moved inexorably to the state legislature. In 
1969 Republicans and Democrats reached a consensus that projected 
their sensitivity to both the economic needs and the traditional values of 
coastal life: oil could come to Maine (the prodevelopment stance) as 
long as it did not harm the environment (the anti-oil stance). To achieve 
this balancing act, the House of Representatives created an interim com­
mittee to study ways of ensuring the safe transportation of oil along the 
Maine coast. The committee was chaired by Harrison Richardson, a 
Portland-area lawyer and liberal Republican with ambitions for higher 
office.22
The House resolution establishing Richardson's committee drew at­
tention to the vulnerability of the Maine coast. Oil spills could not be 
eliminated, the committee recognized, and although they might be in­
frequent, the effect could be catastrophic. By unanimous vote, the bipar­
tisan committee recommended a measure considered by Newsweek mag­
azine to be one of the “nation's strongest antipollution bills ever”: a spill 
abatement program lodged in the Environmental Improvement Com­
mission (EIC) and funded by a tax on oil imported at Maine coast ter­
minals. According to Newsweek, “Outraged industrial lobbyists sputtered 
in disbelief, especially now that Maine's deep-water ports . . . have put 
the state on the verge of an oil bonanza.”23
On the House floor, the debate generated a profusion of bipartisan
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rhetoric proclaiming fidelity to the Maine coast. Intended largely as 
campaign fodder—approval was already a foregone conclusion—the de­
bate demonstrated the growing power of Maine’s pastoral images over 
the legislative process. Richardson opened the debate by pointing out 
the national significance of Maine’s coast. Economically Maine was 
viewed as a “sort of . . . weak sister of the continental United States” he 
conceded, but in this instance its underdevelopment offered an advan­
tage: Maine could avoid the mistakes already made by its more industri­
alized counterparts. Democrat John Jalbert confirmed the bipartisan 
commitment to the pastoral ideal, recalling the days when industry was 
“in complete control” of Maine’s natural landscape, and fumes from the 
polluted rivers peeled paint from nearby buildings. “We have the most 
beautiful coastline in America, and a tourist business and fishing and 
lobstering business[es] that will disappear unless we are able to place 
meaningful controls on a conveyancing of oil.” Maine, according to Jal­
bert, could lead the nation with responsible legislation, and at the same 
time “give our own citizens the protection they need and that they de­
serve.” His speech was followed by several other tributes to the “rock- 
bound coast of Maine, revered by people throughout the world,” and the 
bill passed by a highly unusual vote of 134 to l.24
Legislation enacted by a vote of 134 to 1 contains a variety of un­
stated compromises. For his part, Governor Curtis had gone from label­
ing the NRCM a “bunch of conservative Republicans [who] . . . like 
Maine just fine the way it is” to active cooperation with the newly profes­
sionalized environmental establishment. In fact, by the time the bill 
passed, all sides had reached agreement. Curtis published statements 
supporting the legislation; oil and environmental lobbyists joined the 
negotiations, and committee hearings on the bill generated “massive” 
demonstrations of public support.25
While back room negotiations probably explain the nearly unani­
mous vote on the Oil Conveyancing Act, this consensus was unusual, 
given the emotional tenor of the process. The debate and vote reflect a 
release of long-standing frustration with Maine’s status as New Eng­
land’s poor country cousin. In the oil controversy Mainers of all kinds 
were beginning to savor the new importance of their coast as a deep wa­
ter resource and as a pastoral sanctuary. Big industry, urban New Eng­
land, and the nation at large seemed to need Maine. The state’s nine­
teenth-century motto, Dirigo (“I Lead”), assumed new significance as 
the legislative special session garnered nationwide media attention. Rep­
resentative Jalbert’s remark about the “eyes of the nation” on Maine ar­
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ticulated an emotional sensitivity entirely new to the chronically de­
pressed state. According to the New York Times, “the magnitude of sup­
port for these imaginative conservation measures . . demonstrates not 
only the good sense of the people of Maine, but the power of a good idea 
whose time has finally come.”26
The Oil Conveyancing Act was accompanied by another bill that al­
lowed the EIC to regulate site location for large industrial developments. 
Endorsed by a two-to-one margin, the Site Location Bill attracted far 
less attention than its companion legislation, but was destined to have 
more impact on the evolution of environmental consciousness in 
Maine. The law established two new procedures: a form of “spot zoning1' 
for developments over twenty acres, to be administered by state, rather 
than local, government and a procedure mandating public hearings on 
controversial projects. In a mostly rural state unused to any form of 
public land-use planning or zoning, but with a long tradition of con­
tentious local town meetings, the law seemed tailored to raising grass­
roots environmental awareness.27
The standards set by the act were an invitation to controversy: a 
project would be approved if the developer had the financial and techni­
cal capacity to ensure that it would fit “harmoniously into the existing 
natural environment” and that it would not “adversely affect existing 
uses, scenic character, natural resources or property values in the munic­
ipality or in adjoining municipalities ” The political implications of the 
new law were first tested in connection with the King Resources super­
tanker port proposal for Portland’s Long Island. A source of public con­
troversy for over two years, the project had already polarized public 
opinion. EIC Chair Donaldson Koons predicted that the meetings 
would be a learning experience for everyone; an expectation borne out 
by subsequent events.28
On a hot, muggy afternoon in May, 1970, a crowd of citizens gath­
ered in a Portland high school gymnasium for the first meeting under 
the new Site Location Law. Problems with the public address system au­
gured for a generally chaotic meeting: speakers shouted, the audience 
called for louder voices, and tempers rose, all familiar experiences for 
Mainers used to annual town meeting. Organized resistance was spear­
headed by CWC, by now a veteran grassroots fighter, while a new Maine 
Citizens Oceanology Alliance, claiming 300 members, added support. 
King Resources got “only two tentative and timid claps,” while Koons 
had to gavel for order several times to halt applause for the opponents. A 
steady parade of homemakers, small business owners, summer resi­
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dents, fishermen, and property owners kept the meeting lively through 
the long afternoon and evening. Business reporter Frank Sleeper found 
the seven hour hearing lengthy, disorganized, and emotional: a “weary­
ing” session. Chairman Koons tried to confine debate to the narrow is­
sue of how the King pier would affect the environment, but he was over­
whelmed by the “mass of emotion” focused on the broader implications 
of the tanker port. The hearings provide ample evidence of the extent to 
which the oil controversy had, by 1970, penetrated local consciousness.29
Representatives from King Resources began the hearing by observing 
that Portland Harbor was already a major oil port, with extensive tank 
farms lining its inner shores. The proposed supertanker pier, located in 
the outer harbor, would have the latest pollution safeguards, and to ac­
commodate aesthetic sensibilities the storage tanks and buildings would 
be painted “soft green and white . . .  to maintain the motif of an island 
village.” A row of trees would screen the facility from the neighboring 
town of Falmouth. Oil terminals, they asserted, were located at “some of 
the most prominent and elegant beaches throughout the world.”30
This entreaty drew support from a scattered audience contingent in­
terested in jobs. One group of Long Island residents presented a petition 
supporting the project, and one local predicted that if Mainers remained 
hostile to projects like this Portland’s youth would “have to move to 
Philadelphia to find work in a refinery and come up here in summer.” 
The King representatives closed on a note of frustration: “By now, we 
have lost track of the public hearings . . . Our critics have had thirteen 
months and I have heard nothing new. If there is homework to be done, 
King Resources Company has done it. We would like to get on with our 
job.”31
These complaints only stimulated the opposition. Since the hearing 
was informal, the audience was allowed to pose questions directly from 
the floor. CRAC lobbyist Harold Pachios asked if King intended to ex­
pand the facility later to service even larger tankers. Receiving an indefi­
nite reply, he continued his badgering, prompting an angry declaration 
that King’s future plans were “none of your business.” Others joined in 
the fray, touching off a lengthy exchange between the audience and the 
commissioners, again reminiscent of the sometimes rough-and-tumble 
proceedings at a Maine town meeting.32
It was clear that the commissioners felt a need to educate the public 
on the purpose of the Site Location Law, but it was also clear that citi­
zens were more interested in provoking heated argument than in learn­
ing the finer points of hearing protocol. A shout from the audience that
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“a majority of Maine people don’t want the oil industry at all,” brought 
Commissioner Delogu’s response that the question was not “subject to 
popular vote” Another CRAC lawyer, Horace Hildreth, Jr., began baiting 
King representatives with questions, irrelevant to the hearing, about 
plans to construct a refinery. When this was ruled out of order, Hildreth 
turned to the crowd: “I share [your] frustration . . .  in trying to find out 
what is King Resources [sic] really up to.” Rapping his gavel for order, 
Koons responded sarcastically: “If you are quiet, you may . have a 
chance to find out.”33
As the afternoon wore on into the evening, erudite witnesses and 
folk philosophers demonstrated varying abilities to express the feelings 
of the audience, clearly weighted against King Resources. Concerns 
raised about the project’s impact on residential property values, scenic 
integrity, and the Casco Bay quality of life, earned more or less sustained 
applause. The final effect of the project, as local legislator Mary Payson 
put it, was akin to “dropping a somewhat overripe mackerel on the 
doorsteps of Falmouth.” A representative of Keep Oil Out (KOO), one of 
several emerging opposition groups, attempted to pass out oil soaked 
postcards to the commissioners, who refused the gift.34
The hearing fully engaged the complex environmental constituency 
emerging out of the oil port issue. Town officials from Portland’s sub­
urbs focused on the lack of comprehensive planning for Casco Bay; fish­
ers and boatbuilders expressed fears of more pollution; marine scientists 
spoke of the economic potential of aquaculture; residents and recre­
ationists worried about oil on their “white, white beaches.” The varied 
concerns were perhaps best summarized by Ellis O’Brien, a long-time 
resident who argued that Maine was at a crossroads: “Twenty years ago, 
we would have had to jump like a fish at bait if somebody like King Re­
sources [came to Maine] . . There was no alternative.” Maine was still 
economically weak, but O’Brien and people like him had learned to em­
brace this unique working landscape of small, traditional activities as a 
place “where people can get out of the cities and go to live.” This new 
pastoral sensitivity, as O’Brien concluded, was “inconsistent, to say the 
least. . .  with industrial development.” Defending the bay from “arrogant 
industrialists,” witnesses politicized the rustic metaphors at the core of 
Maine’s self-identity.35
The EIC voted against the Long Island project on grounds that it 
posed too great a risk to recreational assets in the Casco Bay region. 
While this decision was eventually reversed by the Maine Supreme 
Court, the promoter went bankrupt in the interim and the project was
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abandoned. The controversy was thus decided by broader economic de­
velopments, but politically it was a crucial moment for Maine’s emerg­
ing grassroots constituency. The tanker port hearings crystallized the 
major themes of Maine’s new environmental consciousness: a new, 
proud self-awareness of Maine’s unique gift to the nation; a reminder of 
past injustices at the hands of outside interests; a sense of pastoral abun­
dance; a vision of change that could be directed away from the mistakes 
of America’s industrial past. Such optimism was new to Maine, and it 
energized people like Ellis O’Brien, spreading environmental concern 
well beyond the issue of an oil dock in Portland’s back yard. Maine’s tra­
ditional town meeting dialogue had been transformed into an environ­
mental revival meeting.36
Act 3. The Meaning of “Clean”
While the King Resources oil port was under review, a third proposal 
was initiated in 1971 by yet another independent oil promoter. Fuel 
Desulphurization, Inc. was created to help New York Consolidated Edi­
son meet air quality standards for its metropolitan generating facilities. 
When the promoter was blocked by local zoning officials and outraged 
citizens in suburban New York, it turned to Maine, hoping to convert its 
federal license into a project that would serve Boston area utilities’ simi­
lar needs for low sulphur fuel. Renamed Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., the 
company first approached South Portland, home to Maine’s largest con­
centration of existing oil facilities. But King Resources had already 
spoiled the ground. When thousands of citizens signed petitions oppos­
ing the idea, South Portland officials reversed their initial positive re­
sponse. Promoters looked for a site as yet unencumbered by Maine’s 
new environmental consciousness.37
Politically, Maine Clean Fuels’ second choice was even less astute. 
The Penobscot Bay town of Searsport was physically suitable and eco­
nomically convenient, with an existing industrial harbor and a rail con­
nection, but the supertankers would have to pass through a section of 
the coast renowned for its tourism, in-shore fisheries, and yachting. The 
midcoast harbored summer homes for some of the nation’s wealthiest 
families. For just this reason Governor Curtis remained aloof from the 
Maine Clean Fuels project, but promoters found sufficient local support 
to push ahead.38
The opposition opened by organizing public meetings in the lower
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bay towns, and the region’s summer people began a letter-writing cam­
paign that landed over 1,200 letters on the governor’s desk. Intending to 
demonstrate that it, too, had substantial public support, Maine Clean 
Fuels staged a meeting in Searsport, announcing ahead of time that only 
local residents would be admitted. To enforce the “locals only” rule, 
company officials posted uniformed guards at the entrance to the gym­
nasium where the meeting was to be held. State police with riot gear 
stood in reserve. While only about 200 citizens entered the building, an­
other 800 milled around outside with placards and anti-oil literature. 
When police and local officials decided to open the gym to everyone, the 
moderator attempted to maintain decorum by redefining the meeting as 
an informational session. Although the protesters eventually quieted 
down, they had more than made their point; the event succeeded only in 
portraying the company as a political novice with villainous overtones.39
By the time the EIC held Site Location Permit hearings in March 
1971, eleven of the fifteen towns around the lower Penobscot Bay had 
voted against the project. Determined to avoid the town meeting-style 
badgering they had experienced at Portland, the commissioners estab­
lished strict rules to control testimony and witness qualifications. Audi­
ence members were required to submit all questions in writing to the 
EIC chair and applause was prohibited. Commission Chair Donaldson 
Koons opened the hearings with a warning to the audience to avoid 
emotional displays: All testimony was to be “factual and should address 
itself to the issues.” Koons then read a letter from Governor Curtis who 
cautioned that Maine people should put their faith in the Site Location 
Law as a guarantee of the state’s environmental integrity. Under these re­
straints, the hearing was reduced to a string of “long, tedious and repeti­
tious testimony”; the initial attendance of over 700 persons dwindled to 
about 200 per day. Thus while the opening scenes of the drama had been 
vociferous and demonstrative, the middle scenes were more earnest and 
determined, dominated by a professional presentation style.40
During the hearings, Maine Clean Fuels stressed the safety of its so­
phisticated pollution prevention equipment and the economic benefits 
that would flow from the project. Company president David Scoll re­
ferred to the 900 page application and promised even more data on air 
and water quality, noise abatement, and protection of the marine envi­
ronment. Shifting to the central legal issue in the application, whether 
the project would adversely impact “existing uses,” Scoll provided a slide 
show demonstrating that the Searsport area was already industrialized. 
Scoll was followed by supporters representing pulp and paper, railroad,
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and trucking firms, the Searsport port authority, and local citizen 
groups. A Maine State Labor Council official reiterated Maine’s tradi­
tional concern for jobs: “Many argue that Maine’s scenic coastline will be 
ruined by the refinery. But what does the presence of substandard hous­
ing and tarpaper shacks do to enhance our coastline? How do people 
who are poorly attired, undernourished and ravaged by ill health con­
tribute to a scenic view?” Dividing Mainers into wealthy preservationists 
and forward-thinking humanists was a common mode of political dis­
course in the debate. Columnist Donald Hansen suggested that since 
Penobscot Bay was simply a “private domain” for the privileged, it was 
not worth preserving. To struggling mill town residents, “all this pious 
talk about saving the Maine coast must seem so much baloney when you 
can’t get to it.”41
There was substance to the argument that wealthy summer visitors 
were active in the anti-oil campaign, but by 1971 the issue was far more 
complex. In fact, opposition cut across Maine’s heterogeneous coastal 
population, which included retirees and summer residents but also fish­
ers, farmers, small business owners, and service workers. Local organiz­
ers gathered 23,315 signatures on a petition against the project, easily 
outnumbering those submitted by the oil proponents. Notwithstanding 
the commissioners’ disclaimers about a popular plebiscite, this kind of 
grassroots opposition weighed heavily in the debate.42
The most convincing arguments against the refinery came from or­
dinary citizens whose claim to authority lay in their lifelong experience 
on the coast. With an air of authenticity and ownership, Ossie Beal, pres­
ident of the Maine Lobstermen’s Association, focused on the threats to 
his own livelihood, demonstrating the stern self-interest and local un­
derstanding that had become so convincing in statewide press coverage. 
The refinery, he argued, threatened the lobster, clam, and marine worm 
fisheries. “We who have spent our lives on the coast of Maine are familiar 
with its strong tides, its heavy fog, its rocky shoals and severe storms, 
[and] believe it to be one of the riskiest places to handle oil. For this rea­
son we believe that spills are inevitable.” Beal’s local knowledge was 
clearly more impressive than the promoters’ promises and statistical 
projections.43
Adding to this testimony were several Maine coast retirees who drew 
their authority from life experiences in more industrialized settings. El­
liot Preston, a retired chemical engineer from Pittsburgh, drew a com­
pelling contrast between the pastoral dream and the industrial night­
mare: “It can only be the purest wishful thinking to believe that through
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som e m ysterious alchem y a refinery and  oil p o rt can exist w ith o u t the 
a tte n d an t in d u stria l, obnox ious a tm o sp h ere  th a t is an in tegral p a rt 
[of] . . refinery  techno logy" Likewise, a re tired  oil tanker captain , 
Karsten Pendersen, testified tha t the approaches to Penobscot Bay were 
“the m ost dangerous along the East Coast."44
The Searsport hearings closed after eight days. M aine C lean Fuels 
was allowed to  revise its plans fu rther, b u t this was o f no avail. The EIC 
found tha t the p ro m o ter had  failed to present adequate evidence on 
m ore th an  ten  key po in ts  and  den ied  the application. M ost im p o rtan t, 
the com pany  had  n o t d em o n stra ted  th a t an oil com plex could “fit h a r­
m oniously  in to  the existing natu ra l env ironm ent" and  the  existing uses 
o f the Penobscot Bay region. B ridging the gap betw een locals and  “su m ­
m er people," preservationists w on the  day.45
Public testim ony on  the Searsport oil p ro m o tio n  represented  the 
h igh-w ater m ark  o f the em erging env ironm enta list political cu lture  in 
M aine. N ever again w ould  the issues seem  so clear, and  never again 
w ould they be so sim ply stated as they  were d u ring  those eight days in 
Searsport. P rom oters repeated  the tr ied  and  tru e  form ula o f p rosperity  
and  progress based on industria lization ; opponen ts  stressed the public 
claims to the coast as the fon t o f M aine's pastoral identity. W hite beaches 
and  w hite hats aligned against black oil in a stra igh t yes-or-no  p ro p o si­
tion .
Act 4. Planning To Manage The Environmentalist Majority
A fter the Searsport hearings the  focus o f the oil controversy shifted 
to professional p lann ing . W ith  the shadow  of “big oil" still hang ing  over 
the coast, state regulators and  organized  environm entalists de term ined  
tha t com prehensive p lann ing  w ould  be preferable to decision m aking 
th ro u g h  the con ten tious tow n m eeting  m odel. Instead o f w aiting for 
outside p rom oters  to in itiate  specific proposals, they fo rm ed  a new p a r t­
nersh ip  to  exam ine all sides o f the issue and  deliver a decision to the leg­
islature an d  the  people o f  M aine. A lthough  statew ide p lann ing  failed to 
resolve the oil controversy, this professional approach  w ould  have far- 
reaching im plications to r later env ironm enta l issues.
The new  em phasis on  com prehensive p lann ing  suggested th a t the 
d o o r was still open  to oil developm ent som ew here on  the M aine coast. 
W ith  this un d ers tan d in g , in 1971 EIC C hair Koons asked G overnor C u r­
tis to  create a task force to survey po ten tia l sites. C urtis was receptive;
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during the three long years of controversy he had conceded only that the 
refinery should be located inland from the supertanker port, and that 
the mid-Maine coast was inappropriate for oil port development. But as 
long as the initiative lay with the oil promoters, Maine was open to an 
endless round of hearings like those at Portland and Searsport. The mo­
mentum against oil might become politically irreversible.46
On November 10,1971, Governor Curtis appointed twenty-two peo­
ple to a new Task Force on Energy, Heavy Industry, and the Maine Coast. 
Included were legislators, environmentalists, civic leaders, academics, 
business owners, bankers, and a lobsterman. In his instructions, Curtis 
pointed to the conflicting pressures from those who looked to the coast 
“as a source of jobs in a time of high unemployment, recreation and 
solitude in a time of urban unrest, marine resources in a time of worri­
some food projections, energy during an energy shortage, tax dollars to 
relieve unfair property taxes, and profit in a declining economy” The 
Task Force was to minimize these conflicts by categorizing potential de­
velopment sites, sparing the state the “costs and confusions of continual 
heavy industrial speculation over the whole length of the Maine coast ” 
Planning would provide the overarching political authority that had 
eluded the administration during the public hearings. The Task Force 
took this instruction literally, making no effort to assess public feeling 
under the assumption that the report would be “more useful for not 
having been tailored to meet subsequent public reaction.”47
During the Task Force's eight month review of the coast situation, 
Curtis continued to prepare ground for public acceptance of this new 
approach to the oil controversy. In what journalists called a “minor mir­
acle,” CRAC agreed with unnamed industrialists that the state should 
designate a single oil port for Maine. As the Task Force was completing 
its final report, however, the oil tanker Tamano ran aground off Portland 
Harbor, creating the most serious oil spill in Maine history While this 
seemed prescient to oil opponents, the Task Force brushed off the event 
and recommended Portland as Maine's single oil port. The compromise 
was clear: Maine would preserve its coast by sacrificing Portland, already 
the state's most industrialized harbor.48
Although calculated to bring opposite sides together, the recommen­
dation succeeded only in dividing coastal residents; some opposed all 
development, while others worried that without tanker ports Maine 
would be isolated from the economic mainstream, like a “giant state 
park ” John Cole, the outspoken editor of the Maine Times, accepted the 
premise that oil development somewhere in Maine was “inevitable.”
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CRAC founder Horace Hildreth did not. These divisions became clear in 
May 1972 when the Army Corps of Engineers held hearings in Portland 
as part of a general survey of East Coast deep water ports. CWC, MAS, 
and the Sierra Club opposed designating Portland as Maine's oil port; 
NRCM and CRAC were conspicuously absent. The planning approach 
to resolving the oil controversy failed, largely because it split the envi­
ronmental movement, even as environmentalism was achieving its 
broadest popular support in Maine. The consequences became apparent 
when the bill implementing the Task Group report was introduced in 
the 1973 legislature. Environmentalists categorically opposed to oil any­
where on the coast united with industrialists categorically opposed to 
state attempts to limit private oil initiatives and, together, they defeated 
the bill.49
With central planning out of the picture after 1973, new oil promo­
tions appeared, often with environmentalists on both sides of the issue.
Pittston Company map showing Eastport location in relation to existing terminals 
in the northeast, “Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at
Eastport, Maine,’1 April 19, 1973.
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.
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Hearings had become courtlike procedures. With strong backing from 
the governor, NRCM, and former CRAC lobbyist Harold Pachios, the 
independent Gibbs Oil Company proposed a pipeline carrying crude oil 
from Portland Harbor to an inland refinery at Sanford. Harrison 
Richardson, preparing a bid for the governor's seat, supported the Gibbs 
proposal and expressed frustration with Maine's overly complicated en­
vironmental regulations. The state's number one priority was jobs, he 
claimed; as governor, he would work to soften Maine's anti-industry im­
age. According to Pachios, opponents of industrial development were 
typically “well off, and they don't want change." After lengthy site loca­
tion hearings, years of effort, and millions of dollars in expenses, the 
project was abandoned due to falling oil prices.50
With the statewide planning concept in shambles, the Maine coast 
received one last oil proposal. Unlike the others, the Pittston Company 
plan for a refinery at Eastport, near the Canadian border, seemed 
doomed from the start. It called for construction of one of nation's 
largest refineries at the end of a narrow, twisting coastal passage on a 
fog-shrouded coast renowned for huge tides and swift currents. Head 
Harbour Passage, moreover, lay in international waters, and the Cana­
dian government steadfastly refused to jeopardize its local fisheries. 
Moreover, Pittston's lack of corporate responsibility was already leg­
endary. In 1972 a dam at a Pittston coal cleaning plant in Virginia rup­
tured, burying the town of Buffalo Creek in mud and leaving 125 dead 
and 4,000 homeless. A $205 million lawsuit hung over the company 
while it negotiated for the oil refinery in Eastport. In 1975 the state gave 
tentative approval to the project, but listed sixty-four conditions to be 
met before final authorization; over the next two years Pittston did little 
to meet the conditions. The company’s federal applications were equally 
suspect. Its air quality modeling, for example, lacked local meteorologi­
cal data. In the event of a refinery spill Pittston simply planned to ignite 
the oil, an idea those familiar with the region's notoriously heavy 
weather found appalling. And finally, because the site was near Roosevelt 
International Park on Campobello Island, the EPA permit came with 
stringent air emissions requirements, and the area was home to several 
endangered marine species and nesting bald eagles.51
Yet local resistance played a decisive role in the long Pittston contro­
versy, confirming a shift in values even in the hard-pressed communities 
of eastern Maine. A location too remote to attract influential “summer 
people," Eastport s fate seemed to hang on local support or opposition to 
“big oil" and its promise of jobs and prosperity. Throughout the contro-
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Pittston Company artist’s rendering of the proposed oil refinery and marine termi­
nal at Eastport. From The Pittston Company,“Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refin­
ery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine,” April 19, 1973.
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University o f Maine.
versy federal officials orchestrated the public hearings as dull renditions 
of project history and permit processes, and locals were given the im­
pression that the decision was in the hands of “the bureaucrats, not the 
people.” Despite this, and a 20 percent local unemployment rate, local 
opponents continued to turn out for state and federal hearings, becom­
ing even more vocal and more strident in their anticorporate overtones 
as the controversy dragged on. At a 1975 meeting before state officials, 
nearly a third of the 150 who attended rose to speak and all but a few op­
posed the project.52
Given the unending round of permit hearings and the dogged resist­
ance in Eastport, the issue faded from public view when oil prices stabi­
lized in the late 1970s. With the defeat of King Resources, Maine Clean 
Fuels, and now Pittston, it appeared that the Maine coast was free of im­
pending threat. There was, as journalist Richard Saltonstall pointed out, 
always the possibility that “sooner or later a big league corporation 
would present a concrete plan . . .  supported by reams of data to answer 
every conceivable question,” and the quandary of underdevelopment 
would drive home the logic of oil port development. But the victory over
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Schematic of Pittston Company’s proposed oil refinery and terminal at Eastport. 
“Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine," 
April 19, 1973. Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.
“big oil was part of a nationwide shift in thinking about the costs and 
benefits of energy development. Controversies like the offshore oil and 
gas leases on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the TVA’s Tellico Dam on 
the Little Tennessee, the Seabrook nuclear energy plant in New Hamp­
shire, the Kaiparowitz coal fired generating plant in Utah, and the oil- 
shale proposals in Colorado correlated with Maine’s shift in thinking 
about growth, energy, and quality of life.53
Conclusion
Reflecting on the events of the early 1970s, editor John Cole mused 
about the appearance of a “populist, top-to-bottom, rich-to-poor, right- 
to-left, universal constituency’’ raised to defend Maine’s pastoral land­
scape: “It’s as if this corner of America, parked for two centuries in a ge­
ographic and economic backwater, has been banked all these years just 
so it could be here when Americans decided for the first time since the 
Industrial Revolution that there may be a better way.” By popularizing 
pastoralism as an alternative to industrial growth, the oil controversy 
served as midwife to a grassroots environmental movement. Hence­
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forth, nature would be given due consideration in all manner of devel­
opment proposals.54
In the early years of this debate Robert Monks had raised a question 
that few intelligent politicians would have dared to ask publicly: if in­
deed Maine succeeded in holding industry at bay, must it then do every­
thing in its power, “through social, economic and political initiatives, to 
keep people where historical accident put them a hundred years ago?” 
Wilderness advocates in the west might have pondered Monks's ques­
tion seriously, but in Maine the integrity of the pastoral landscape still 
signified a people imbedded comfortably in a natural world, the folk be­
ing as important an ingredient in the Downeast landscape as nature. 
Thus as the curtain rang down on “big oil,” the Maine Times once again 
took up the question of jobs, cognizant that some had defended Pittston 
only because their communities had no better economic options. Editor 
Peter Cox proposed a new “marine trades center” at a closed cannery 
complex in Eastport and new light industrial uses for Eastport's deep 
water wharf. Others counseled only further patience. “If people hung 
on . . .  the area could prosper under controlled development of its recre­
ational assets, even as a summer colony based on arts and crafts or 
new kind of national park,” journalist Richard Saltonstall suggested. 
Once again Maine seemed to have time to craft a vision for its unique 
blend of natural and scenic resources, time to gain perspective on Amer­
ica's headlong dash to techno-utopia. Cox noted in governing circles a 
lingering feeling that “Maine has nothing to offer itself, and so must 
court people from outside to come in and take advantage of us.” But 
most Mainers, he thought, seemed ready to abandon the “big bang solu­
tion” to economic problems. Maine's best chance was as it always had 
been: a slow accumulation of diversified small industries attracted to the 
state's varied natural resources and to its hard-working, enterprising 
people. “Organic” growth—making bricks from local clays, raising mus­
sels and oysters, harvesting seaweed for fertilizer, manufacturing wind­
mills, cabinets, and other secondary products from local woods, print­
ing, and perhaps an agricultural resurgence geared to greater regional 
self-sufficiency—spelled the future for the Maine coast. During the pro­
tracted fight, popular thinking about Maine's growth strategies had 
come full circle: small industries and a rural folk eking out an independ­
ent living once again provided the image, if not the reality of life on the 
coast.55
Maine had gained much from the performances of the “theater of 
oil” By the mid-1970s the state had passed landmark legislation that
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lodged veto power over heavy industry in the state planning apparatus. 
Perhaps more important, the battle for the coast drew national attention 
to Maine’s distinction as a postindustrial sanctuary for all of the North­
east, and in the process advanced the environmental message immeasur­
ably Energized by public hearings and by multiple threats to a familiar 
way of life, statewide organizations and grassroots groups gained confi­
dence, experience, and an audience well beyond their initial upper-class 
base. This company of vacationers, hunters, anglers, hikers, backpackers, 
women’s club and civic group members, PTA leaders, journalists, scien­
tists, politicians, and the “many Mainers who live in urban areas but who 
have camps and cottages on the coast, [or] on the lakes” remained the 
heart and soul of Maine environmentalism. The themes articulated in 
the "theater of oil”—the limits of technology, the pressures of develop­
ment, the specter of 70 million urban and suburban dwellers within a 
day’s drive of Maine—committed Maine’s environmentalist majority to 
a new cultural construction of their state.56
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